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DESIGN DEFECT. LITIGATION REVISITED
James A. Henderson,Jr.t
For more than a year I have followed the work of the four
co-authors1 of the preceding Article, 2 and with growing interest
have become aware of the implications of their work to mine. Thus,
when Professor Twerski sent me a copy of their latest manuscript, I
was delighted. Since the publication of my own Article in the Columbia Law Review, 3 I have come to feel somewhat like a passenger on a
ship at sea who discovers (or thinks he has discovered) a growing
4
leak below the waterline which threatens the ship with destruction.
Telling others of my discovery, I have frequently encountered
two types of reactions: either, "What leak? What water?" or "Yes,
aren't we fortunate! Now we will be able to swim below decks!" The
reaction of these four authors, however, has been different. As I
read their published work, including this latest article, these authors
have also seen the rising water in the ship's hold and recognize the
threat it poses to all on board. 5 Listening to their proposed remedy
of the situation, however, I am still- fearful for my life. Having
recognized the rising water level and its threat to the ship, the
authors deny that it is caused by anything so basic as a leak in the
hull. Instead, they indulge in their own version of the "swimming
pool" reaction, with the difference that they feel the water has been
allowed to get too deep. "Let's man the bilge pumps," they advise,
"and get the below-decks swimming pool into more manageable
proportions." Such advice, if taken, may buy us a little more time,
but in the end the ship is doomed. Grateful as I may be to them for
recognizing that we must do something about the rising water in the
hold, the substance of their proposal has me frantically looking for a
life preserver.
In responding to my earlier analysis, the authors reach four
t Professor of Law, Boston University; Visiting Professor of Law, University of Colorado.
A.B. 1959, Princeton University; LL.B. 1962, LL.M. 1964, Harvard Law School.
I E.g., Donaher, Piehler, Twerski & Weinstein, The TechnologicalExpert inProductsLiability
Litigation, 52 TEXAS L. REV. 1303 (1974); Weinstein, Twerski, Piehler & Donaher, Product
Liability: An Interaction of Law and Technology, 12 DuQ. L. REV. 425 (1974).
2 Twerski, Weinstein, Donaher & PiehIer, The Use and Abuse of Warnings in Product
Liability-DesignDefect Litigation Cones of Age, 61 CORNELL L. REV. 495 (1976) [hereinafter cited
as Twerski].
3 Henderson, Judicial Review of Manufacturers' Conscious Design Choices: The Limits of
Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1531 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Henderson].
4 Id. at 1539, 1578.
' Twerski 535-36.
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basic conclusions. They are, in the sequence in which they appear:
(1) that the failure-to-warn issue is as complex and polycentric as the
issue of defective design; 6 (2) that design defect questions are not
very polycentric and can be answered by the courts employing proper litigation techniques; 7 (3) that design defect cases present a "litany
of litigation problems;" 8 and (4) that these problems can be solved by
replacing our "Model T litigation process" with more sophisticated
trial methods.9 The only one of their conclusions with which I am in
substantial agreement is the third-the litigation problems which the
authors recognize are as threatening to the survival of our commonlaw products liability system as rising water in the hold would be to
the survival of a ship at sea.
However, as for the other conclusions reached by the authors, I
could not disagree more. As I shall try to demonstrate in the remarks that follow, the authors apparently fail to understand the
concept of polycentricity as I advanced it in my earlier Article. As a
consequence, they have erred in assessing the relative feasibility of
the theories of failure to warn and design defect, and they have
erred in their conclusions regarding what should be done to reduce
what they properly recognize to be threats to our common-law
process of products liability litigation. The four co-authors have
seriously misdiagnosed the source and nature of the problem. Their
suggested solution, if accepted and relied upon, would almost certainly doom to destruction the common-law products liability system
which all five of us respect and admire.
I
JUDICIAL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DUTY TO WARN

Nowhere in their Article do the authors reveal more clearly their
misapprehension of my thesis than in their treatment of failure to
warn. Essentially, what I said in my Article was that adjudication has
discernible limits and that courts cannot solve every kind of problem
in our society, including the problem of design safety. Products
liability commentators have focused almost entirely upon the substantive objectives of the liability system, and have overlooked this
important truth regarding the appropriateness of the means of
achieving those objectives. As desirable as it might be- from the
6 Id. at 500-01.
7 Id. at 525.
8 Id.

at 534.

9 Id. at 536.
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perspective of social welfare to implement governmental review of
manufacturers' conscious design choices, courts are not suited to
perform that review independently. What courts can do (besides
applying specific standards established extrajudicially) is to implement a failure-to-warn approach which, though admittedly inadequate in some instances to achieve necessary levels of product safety,
at least does not threaten the procedural integrity of our judicial
system. If failure to warn proves insufficient, as it will in some
situations, 10 then other governmental responses will be necessary."
But to ask courts to deliver more than they are capable of delivering
is to send them on a suicide mission.' 2 In effect, I argued that in the
area of design we ought not let our traditional obsession with the
objective of product safety blind us to the reality that adjudication is
not a suitable means of achieving that end.
What, then, is the perspective that the authors adopt from the
outset in attempting to answer my thesis? They focus upon the
end-objective of achieving socially acceptable levels of product
safety. And what is the first point of substance which the authors
advance by way of "rebuttal" of my thesis? They insist that failure to
warn is not "the panacea for all ills, ' 'a and that "it will not be possible
14
for the courts to rely on warnings alone to ensure product safety."'
With all respect, this sort of talk begs the very question I raised. I
asked whether, assuming that the failure-to-warn approach is not a
"panacea," we can responsibly ask more of the courts. By assuming
that the mission of the courts is "to ensure product safety," -the
authors have assumed away my thesis that such a mission would be
suicidal. In fairness, I should recognize that they also advance the
thesis that courts are suited to doing more-i.e., to reviewing the
reasonableness of product designs-and I shall turn to their thesis in
this regard shortly. However, the reader should be fully aware of
this "failure-to-warn-is-not-a-panacea" technique, oft-repeated
throughout their analysis,' 5 by which the authors shift attention
from the limits of adjudication-as-a-means to the desirability of
product-safety-as-an-end. If my thesis is correct, then all of their talk.
about the social desirability of courts "ensuring product safety"
completely misses the point.
The main thrust of the authors' treatment of failure to warn at
10 Henderson 1560 n.122 and accompanying text.
H Id. at 1574-77.
12
13

Id. at 1578.
Twerski 500.

Id. at 517.
15 Id. at 500, 503, 509-10, 514, 517, 537, 539-40.
14

544
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least appears to meet my thesis directly. They argue that failure to
warn is just as complex, and involves the same levels of polycentricity, as design defect. 1 6 Their argument consists of two points. First,
they insist that in deciding whether a manufacturer should warn of a
hidden risk, the court must consider, among other factors, whether
the warning will have an adverse effect upon the marketability of the
product in question.' 7 In response, I am willing to concede that
consideration of such a factor by a court would render the failureto-warn issue exceedingly polycentric. However, it is nonsensical in
the first place for the authors to suggest that such a factor should or
would be considered by a court in connection with the failure-towarn issue. That is, the entire thrust of the failure-to-warn concept is
a "let the chips fall where they may" commitment to disclosure,
regardless of the impacf of disclosure upon the party making it. In
fact, I would insist that the duty to warn is imposed precisely because
it is anticipated that it may have an adverse impact upon the product's marketability. This has clearly been a matter of first principle
both in products liability' 8 and in other areas of our law dealing on a
16Id at 500-24.
17 [I]f to impose the kind of warning that will truly reduce the risk will lead to
nonmarketability, then the court must consider what alternatives consumers will seek
in order to replace the dangerous product. If, as a result of an adequate warning,
consumers will be faced with alternatives that are even more dangerous than the
questioned product without a warning, then perhaps the warnings should not be
imposed or if imposed should be couched in less frightening language.
Id. at 503.
11 In one ot the classic design defect decisions in our law, Larsen v. General Motors
Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968), the court stated the failure-to-warn principle in these
words:
If, because of the alleged undisclosed defect in design of the 1963 Corvair
steering assembly, an extra hazard is created over and above the normal hazard,
General Motors should be liable for this unreasonable hazard. Admittedly, it would
not sell many cars of this particular model if its sales "pitch" included the cautionary
statement that the user is subjected to an extra hazard or unreasonable risk in the
event of a head-on collision. But the duty of reasonable care should command a
warning of this latent defect that could under certain circumstances accentuate the
possibility of severe injury....
391 F.2d at 505-06.
Of course, unique cases can arise in which courts are tempted to countenance nondisclosure on the ground that the overall good of society will be furthered by keeping consumers
ignorant of risks associated with product use. One such unique case may arise in the context of
a mass immunization of the public against dangerous, communicable disease. In an action
brought against the drug company by one injured by inoculation, if the court became
convinced that immunization was clearly in the public interest it might be tempted to countenance nondisclosure of the risks to the public as a means of facilitating the immunization
process. Although several courts have hinted in this direction (see Reyes v. Wyeth Labs., Inc.,
498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974); Davis v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 399
F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1968)), the decisions thus far are fully supportive of the traditional "let the
chips fall where they may" approach. See generally Kidwell, The Duty to Warn: A Descriptionof the
Model of Decision, 53 TEXAS L. REv. 1375 (1975). In any event, it should be obvious that the
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regular basis with duties to disclose, 19 and I expressly made it a part
of my own analysis of the subject.2 0 It is simply incomprehensible to
me why the authors would suggest otherwise in their Article.?'
Their second basic point in connection with failure to warn is
also erroneous, although less astoundingly so. The authors appear
to insist that, even assuming a commitment to full disclosure, the
question, "When do warnings become so trivial, or numerous, as to
be counterproductive?" is itself sufficiently polycentric to be beyond
the ability of courts to answer. They posit the specter of requiring
"laundry lists" of warnings, 2 to which users and consumers will
inevitably become inured to the point that attempts to warn will
issues presented by cases arising from the mass immunization of the public against deadly
disease are completely atypical and unique. (Cf. the discussion in the following footnote of the
disclosure under federal securities laws of bribes to foreign officials.)
19 Perhaps the clearest example in our law of this traditional commitment to the "let the
chips fall where they may" principle of disclosure is in connection with the sale of securities
governed by the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1970), and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78hh (1970). Two recent developments have tested
this principle in the strongest manner. The first concerns the disclosure requirements in
connection with real estate investments that are credit extensions to Real Estate Investment
Trusts (REIT'S) when those Trusts are in default. Although a strong argument can be made
that full disclosure will in some cases hurt a large number of the very class of persons meant to
be protected by the securities laws, disclosure is nonetheless required. See 5 SEC Docket 772
(1974-75). An even stronger argument for nondisclosure is advanced in connection with the
overseas dealings of some large American corporations, when bribes are occasionally given to
foreign government officials. Should the companies be required to disclose such unsavory
dealings, even if disclosure would probably hurt those same corporations in future transactions abroad? Although the final resolution of this problem is yet to come, it appears likely that
the Securities and Exchange Commission will require disclosure. For the view of one member
of the SEC that exceptions to the rule of full disclosure, if they are to be made at all, should be
established by Congress, see Sommer, The Limits ofDisclosure, FINANCIA, EXECUTIVE, Oct. 1975,
at 46, 50-51.
For a discussion of the physician's duty to inform his patients of the risks incident to
medical treatment, see Henderson 1559 n.121. To the extent that courts have allowed
physicians to weigh the patient's health in deciding whether to inform, they have not submitted to review the custom of the medical profession in this regard. In contrast, the authors here
call for a "disclose only when in the best interests of society" rule, with case-by-case judicial
review of the reasonableness of manufacturers' decisions.
20 Henderson 1559 n.121.
21 Quite frankly, I find much of what the authors say about the relationship between
warning and design incomprehensible. On page 505 of their Article, for example, they state:
"[T]o impose the kind of warning that might make the product reasonably safe constitutes
ipso facto an instruction to the manufacturer to redesign it in a manner that will sharply
reduce its danger level." Can they be unaware of the significance of the phrase "ipso facto" in
their statementjust quoted? The point of my analysis is that, by the very process they describe,
courts can influence manufacturers' product design decisions without being required to decide
how, even at a minimum (see note 47 infra), those products should be redesigned. Their
sentence just quoted is an apt statement of the basic point I am trying to make. Why should I
argue my position when they argue it so eloquently?
22 Twerski 516.
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become futile, and self-defeating. My response here is simply to
recognize that "full disclosure" is not the same as "disclosure of
every detail," and that it may become necessary for courts to decide
in some cases2 3 whether what at first glance appears to be full
disclosure has, in reality, become concealment. However, I insist that
in any event these kinds of questions are not sufficiently polycentric
to render them unadjudicable.
That these questions are not polycentric deserves further elaboration. Once we dismiss the authors' first suggestion (that the
commitment to disclosure should be mitigated by considerations
such as the short-run interests of the manufacturer or the long-run
good of society), and we properly adopt the traditional "let the chips
fall where they may" principle of disclosure, the further question of
what constitutes disclosure in a particular case is not so open-ended
as to be unadjudicable. The questions, "How much warning is
enough?" and "How much warning is too much?" are fundamentally
different from the "How much product safety is enough?'" question
involved in a design defect case. The former questions are decided
along a single value axis (i.e., maximum information to the user or
consumer), whereas the latter question is decided by balancing the
various competing values recognized in the society. 2 4 The inquiry in

a duty-to-warn or duty-to-disclose case is essentially factual-i.e.,
"What are the limits of the recipients' understanding and ability to
understand, and how may the objective of informing the recipients
best be accomplished in light of those limits?" The inquiry in a
design defect case, on the other hand, is substantially normativei.e., "What is a reasonable mix of the competing values at stake in
setting the minimally acceptable level of design safety?"
As I recognized in my Article, 25 if the design defect inquiry were
to be rendered unidimensional-if the only value recognized in such
cases were the safety of the consumer-the inquiry into defectiveness in design cases would become as manageable as the inquiry in
connection with failure to warn. But, unlike the issue of failure to
warn, the issue of unreasonable design is most certainly not unidimensional, and courts are required to balance competing values.2 6
23

The cases will be rare because the manufacturers' self-interest will curb any tendency

to overdo warnings. The authors apparently agree with me here, at least in a different section
of their Article. On page 504, they speak of the judicial "sensitivity to the harshness of an edict
that would require a manufacturer to place on a product a warning which would destroy its
marketability." If they are correct in perceiving that courts are sensitive to the impact of
warnings, then I must be correct here in attributing even greater sensitivity to manufacturers.
24 See text accompanying notes 32-47 infra. See also Henderson 1540.
25 Henderson 1554.
26 Id.
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The point here is not that failure-to-warn cases are never complex; it
is rather that they are not polycentric in the way that design defect
27

cases are.

In fairness to the authors' treatment of the failure-to-warn
issue, I should acknowledge several contributions which they have
made to my understanding of the subject. In particular, I find their
analysis of the "when in doubt, warn" tendency 2 8 useful, and I
would agree that some courts should exercise greater responsibility
in overseeing implementation of the failure-to-warn concept.
Moreover, their analysis of warnings that do not reduce inherent
risks,2 9 together with their conclusion that cases such as Davis v.
Wyeth Laboratories,Inc.,30 must be differentiated from the standard
failure-to-warn case, represent for me valuable insights. However,
these last-described points in no way support the authors' attempt to
respond to my thesis-this particular portion of their analysis has
nothing whatever to do with whether the failure-to-warn issue is or
is not so polycentric as to be beyond the limits of adjudication. The
authors admit as much at the outset of their discussion of failure to
warn 3 1 and it is important for the reader to appreciate that a substantial portion of the authors' treatment of failure to warn is irrelevant to their rebuttal of my thesis. In fact, the sensible and useful
portions of their treatment of this subject are completely consistent
with my analysis of the same subject in the earlier Article to which
they make repeated reference.
II
JUDICAL REVIEW OF PRODUCT DESIGN

I trust it is obvious that the success of the authors' attempt to
rebut my thesis depends upon the persuasiveness of their argument
32
that "design defect cases . . . are not really all that polycentric.
Essentially, the authors attempt to distinguish truly polycentric issues from design defect issues on the basis that in cases involving the
former, "courts are thrown a complex problem and asked to resolve
it on no basis other than general notions of fairness and
equity. .

..

There is no central focal point that becomes the axis

27 Complexity is not the same thing as polycentricity; it is not the number of issues that is
primarily important, but the way in which the issues are related interdependently. Id. at
1535-36.
28 Twerski 513.
29 Id. at 517-21.
30 399 F.2d 121
31 Twerski 500.
32

Id. at 525.

(9th Cir. 1968), discussed in Twerski 517-21.

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61:541

upon which all considerations must turn."' 1 On the other hand,
they argue, "the focal point of [a design defect] case is dearly defined. It revolves around the question of whether ... the product
is not unreasonably dangerous. '3 4 With all respect to the authors'

obvious sincerity, the distinction which they have advanced is
nonexistent.
In the first place, it is unfair to say of the cases which they admit
involve polycentricity that the courts would be guided only by general notions of fairness and equity. In Fuller's prime example, the
division of the art collection between two museums, 35 the court
presumably would be "guided" by what it perceived to be the special
needs of each museum as revealed by the evidence. And to assert
that the concept of "unreasonable danger"--.e., "reasonable needs
of society for product safety"-is inherently any more specific or
precise than "reasonable needs of the art museums" is patently
absurd. The authors recognize, as they must, that in deciding the
question of "unreasonable risks," the courts must weigh competing
factors such as costs, aesthetics and functional utility. 36 I submit that
these are precisely the same variety of factors (admittedly couched in
different language) that the court would weigh in deciding upon a
reasonable division of the paintings in Fuller's case. To be sure, if
safety were to become the only consideration, the design defect issue
would become single-centered and manageable. But such a position
is not, and never has been, recognized in our law 3 7 -as the authors
38
themselves are forced to admit.

What, then; could the authors possibly have in mind when they
assert that safety, in a design defect case, becomes. "the axis upon
which all considerations must turn?" Quite obviously, they mean
that in court, presumably for the first time, safety moves to the head
of the list of priorities among the various competing factors to be
weighed in reaching a decision regarding the reasonableness of the
design.3 9 At the designer's drawing board, safety was merely one
factor among many; in court, it becomes the most important factor.
But what does this point have to do with the degree of polycentricity
posed in either situation, so long as safety does not so dominate
33 Id. at 526.
34 Id.
'5 See Fuller,Adjudication andthe Rule ofLaw, 1960 PROCEEDINGS AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. 1,3-4,
discussed in Twerski 525-26.
36 Twerski 526.
37 See note 27 and accompanying text supra.
38 Twerski 526.
3' See id.
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in-court analysis as to become, in effect, the only factor to be considered? In a word, "nothing."
What the authors are really saying here is that the shift in
perspective that they postulate 40 makes it possible for courts to
disagree with the designers-to impose liability in some instances for
what are determined to have been unreasonable design choices.
Once again, the authors have returned to their basic theme that
courts ought to decide the design defect issue because courts will
thereby advance the social objective of increasing levels of product
safety. What began as an attempt to address the question of whether
this particular means (adjudication) is suited to achieving the ends of
increased product safety has, once again, been subtly transformed
into an assertion that the ends justify the means. Any doubt that this
is what has happened is eliminated by the authors' statement at the
conclusion of the design defect portion of their Article: "[S]afety is
much too important to be left to the designers."' 41 To such an
assertion I am forced to reply that it begs the very question sought to
be answered. Even if it were true that the court would weigh the
various factors differently, the fact remains that the problem of
weighing the various factors would retain its full measure of
42
polycentricity.
If this Article were the authors' only published work addressing
the in-court handling of the design defect issue, I would nevertheless
maintain that the clear meaning of their analysis is as I have characterized it. However, the authors have simplified the task of interpreting their perception of the nature of the design defect issue. In light
of the two Articles published by these same authors within the last
two years, there can be no doubt that the task of reviewing product
design, which they would turn over to the courts to perform, is
exceedingly polycentric. Indeed, writing in the Texas Law Review in
1974, they described the task for the courts in this way:
It is time to abandon the perspective of the reasonable consumer and the reasonable seller and formulate the strict liability
question for what it is. The issue in every products case is whether
the product qua product meets society's standards of acceptability.
The unreasonable danger question, then, is posed in terms of
whether, given the risks and benefits of and possible alternatives
to the product, we as a society will live with it in its existing state or
will require an altered, less dangerous form. Stated succinctly, the
Id. at 526-27.
41 Id at 532.
42 See Henderson 1540 nn. 28-29 and accompanying text.
40

550
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question is whether the product is a reasonable
one given the
43
reality of its use in contemporary society.
In their Article in the Duquesne Law Review in the same year the
authors asserted:
The criteria against which the defective and unreasonably
dangerous nature of any product is tested are broad and far
reaching. In a leading article, Dean Wade has provided a list of
seven succinct indicia for this purpose:
1) The usefulness and desirability of the product
2) The availability of other and safer products to meet the
same need
3) The likelihood of injury and its probable seriousness
4) The obviousness of the danger
5) Common knowledge and normal public expectation of the
danger (particularly for established products)
6) The avoidability of injury by care in use of the product
(including the effect of instructions or warnings)
7) The ability to eliminate the danger without seriously impairing the usefulness of the product or making it unduly
expensive.
While certain of these indicia may be quantifiable with the
remainder requiring subjective evaluation, the final decision as to
whether a product is in fact defective and unreasonably dangerous is an amalgam of all seven....
...This decision has major social and societal significance. It
should be made with full understanding44of the complex trade-offs
which are involved in product design.
It is simply incomprehensible to me how, in light of these
quotations from their recent work in the design defect area, the
authors can now assert that "design defect cases ...are not really all
that polycentric. '45 I leave it to the reader to try to reconcile their
just-quoted statements with the same authors' assertions in their
latest Article that "the focal point of [a design defect] case is clearly
defined."4 6 Moreover, notwithstanding their insistence in this latest
Article that, in court, safety moves to the head of the list of priorities,
what factor appears at the head of the list they adopted as their own
in the above quotation from their earlier Article? "The usefulness
47
and desirability of the product"! Enough said.
43 Donaher, Piehler, Twerski and Weinstein, supra note 1, at 1307 (footnote omitted).
44 'Weinstein, Twerski, Piehler & Donaher, supra note 1, at 429-30, 433-34 (footnotes
omitted).
4- Twerski 525.

46 Id. at 526.
47 Well, almost. The authors raise two other points in their effort to characterize the
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III
A

SENSIBLE SOLUTION TO THE "LITANY
OF LITIGATION PROBLEMS"

It will be recalled that the authors and I are in substantial
agreement that the current approach to litigating design defect cases
reveals serious symptoms of breakdown and debility. 48 Having re-

jected my thesis that the difficulties stem from the nature of the
problems being brought to the courts for solution, the authors
logically (though erroneously) conclude that the source of the problems must inhere in shortcomings of the litigation process itself.
What should be done to correct the situation? Lest I misstate their
position on this critical point, I will quote their statement of it
verbatim. Referring to our traditional adversary system as "a Model
T litigation process which cannot keep up with 1976-type problems," 49 the authors explain:

There exists a naive belief by the bar that we can proceed to the
trial of complex technological issues under the same format that
has governed the presentation of everyday "fender-bender" automobile accidents. Unreasonableness of design, cause-in-fact,
proximate causation, and assumption of risk are complex issues.
They are often interrelated; yet, they are separate and distinct.
To present these problems to a jury in a confused jumble and to
ask them to unscramble the problem places too great a strain on
the adjudication process. A design defect case cannot, we believe,
be tried without a comprehensive understanding of both the
product and the total environment of its use. Experts cannot
continue to be used solely for the purpose of plugging a narrow
evidentiary gap. The experts on either side cannot continue to
design defect issue as single-focused and manageable. I addressed both in my original Article,
but they deserve a response here. First, the authors argue, at page 527, that the design defect
issue is not polycentric because the standards set by the courts are "negative standards." I can
only assume that they are referring to the fact that legal standards are minimum standards.
However, as I pointed out in my earlier Article this fact does not detract from their status as
standards of behavior, so long as the process of balancing various factors is involved. Henderson 1533 n. 13, 1540 nn.28-29 and accompanying text. See generally L. FULLER, THE MORALITY
OF LAW 3-13 (2d ed. 1969). The authors appear to admit as much at the outset of their Article
when they assert "that courts have been actively engaged in setting product safety standards in
a broad range of cases." Twerski 496.
The authors' second point is that the polycentricity is reduced in some cases because an
isolated feature of the product is involved, rather than the entire product. Twerski 528. In
some cases this may be true (see Henderson 1571 n.164 and accompanying text), but not very
often. In most cases, the component part is sufficiently integrated into the whole to require the
whole to be considered in the process ofjudging the acceptability of the part. See Henderson
1540 n.29.
4' See Twerski 535.
49 Id. at 536.
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present polar positions, rather than thoughyful intermediary positions
which most often truly represent the real area of disagreement
without badly compromising the integrity of the case. And, as
mentioned earlier, the wholesale acceptance of theoretical evidence cannot be permitted to taint the believability of the litigation process. Yet, as we have demonstrated, some or all of the
aforementioned problems compromise
50 the work-product of the
best litigated products liability trials.
As I interpret the authors' statement, they are turning an old
adage on its head: If Mohammed will not come to the mountain,
then the mountain will come (or in this instance will be sent) to
Mohammed. That is, if design defect cases are not being rendered
amenable to adjudication, then adjudication will have to be modified
to suit design defect cases. The nature of the suggested modifications could not alarm me more. In effect, the authors are urging that
we try to solve the litigation problems in this area by making the
adversary process less adversary and litigation less litigious. The
core of their position is contained in that portion of the above
quotation in italics-the problems arise because lawyers in these
cases naively believe that they can continue to take the traditional
"polar positions" of adversaries in a lawsuit, rather than the type of
"thoughtful intermediary positions" one might associate with a
thoughtful, sensitive discussion between friends. Lawyers, it turns
out, are making the mistake of acting too much like advocates in
these cases!
I cannot state my negative reaction to such a suggestion too
emphatically. Of course litigation could handle polycentric problems
if it were made over into a thinly veiled process of court-supervised
and court-imposed compromise and negotiation. 5' The authors'
idea that we can or should rely upon the good will of the parties to
narrow "the real area of disagreement" reveals them as more naive
than the trial bar to whom they refer at the outset of the abovequoted statement. And the alternative of the court coercing the
Id. at 535-36 (emphasis supplied).
51 Just because polycentric problems pose difficulties for adjudication does not mean they
cannot be solved by other decision processes. See Henderson 1538. If my analysis is correct,
the only way that the authors' suggested changes in litigation techniques could possibly render
the problems manageable would be to change adjudication into an amalgam of other nonadjudicative techniques. These changes would, no doubt, be subtly disguised to preserve appearances. But the lawyer's instincts will detect the implications in the authors' suggestions that
lawyers begin to present "thoughtful middle positions" and that judges begin to play a far
more active role in determining how these cases are presented. Coupled with the authors'
suggestion that neutral experts be utilized (see Weinstein, Twerski, Piehler & Donaher, supra
note 1, at 460 n.31), the real substance of the authors' proposals should be clear to most
lawyers who consider them.
50
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parties into such a compromising stance is repugnant to my professional sensibilities (old fashioned as they may be in this regard). In
effect, the authors would have the system of adjudication say to trial
lawyers: "Look, we obviously cannot cope with this sort of case on
the traditional assumptions of our adversary system. So, come onease up on your tendencies to represent your clients zealously, and
agree to take thoughtful intermediarypositions in the interests of what is
good for society." If anyone doubts that this is exactly what is at
stake in taking the authors' suggestions seriously, let him read Fuller's application of the polycentricity concept to the labor arbitration
field,52 or review the actual experience of both trial courts and the
bar in certain recent environmental law cases where, in effect, the
reasonableness of environmental design choices are sought to be
53
reviewed judicially on a fairly regular basis.
52

See Fuller, Collective Bargainingand the Arbitrator, 1963 Wis. L. REV. 3. In his Article,

Professor Fuller posits a labor arbitrator presented with a polycentric problem and "intent on
preserving judicial proprieties." Id. at 34. Recognizing what he calls the serious quandary
facing the arbitrator in such circumstances, Fuller proceeds:
What modifications of his role will enable the arbitrator to discharge this task
satisfactorily? The obvious expedient is a resort to mediation. After securing a
general education in the problems involved in [reaching a solution], the arbitrator
might propose to each side in turn a tentative solution, inviting comments and
criticisms. Through successive modifications a reasonably acceptable [solution] might
be achieved, which would then be incorporated in an award. Here the dangers
involved in the mediative role are probably at a minimum, precisely because the need
for that role seems, so obvious. Those dangers are not, however, absent. There is
always the possibility that mediative efforts may meet shipwreck. Prolonged involvement in an attempt to work out a settlement agreeable to both parties obscures the
arbitrator's function as ajudge and makes it difficult to reassume that role. Furthermore, a considerable taint of the "rigged" award will in any event almost always attach
to the final solution. The very fact that this solution must involve a compromise of
interests within the union itself makes this virtually certain.
Id. at 35. I submit that Fuller's description of the pressures upon the arbitrator, and the
arbitrator's likely reactions to those pressures, accurately capture the essence of the authors'
suggestions for modifying our process of litigation so that it can handle design defect cases
satisfactorily. The dangers to which Fuller refers would be far greater if such conduct were
indulged in by courts. See the discussion of an actual case in the following footnote.
53 Perhaps the dearest example of a trial court reacting strongly and critically to what it
perceived to be a lack of cooperation by defense counsel will be found in the district court
decision in United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 380 F. Supp. 11 (D. Minn. 1974). The action
in that case was brought to enjoin the defendant company's practice of dumping mining
wastes into Lake Superior on the ground that the public health was thereby endangered.
(Other defendants were joined, but that fact is irrelevant here.) As in product design actions,
one important issue was the technological feasibility of alternative courses of conduct. The
defendant is a large company employing thousands of persons in northeastern Minnesota.
Quite understandably, the task of assessing the risks and balancing the various public interests
at stake was most difficult and polycentric. After 139 days of trial, which involved over 18,000
pages of transcript, the federal district court entered an order enjoining the defendant from
dumping wastes into the lake. Toward the end of a long opinion, the court reveals tremendous
frustration and resentment over the defendant's failure throughout the trial to simplify the
issues by adopting what the present authors would undoubtedly call "thoughtful intermediary
positions":
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Lest I be unfair to the work these authors have done elsewhere
on the subject of "modernizing" the processes by which design
defect issues are resolved, let me hasten to recognize that they have
greatly condensed their views for the purposes of the present Article,
and that my reaction to their condensation inevitably tends to some
extent to oversimplify their position. I strongly urge readers who are
intrigued with the authors' suggestions or concerned with the mix of
problems all five of us have tried to describe to read the recent
analyses by these same authors cited in this latest Article. 54 Quite
frankly, there is much solid work and useful insight in what they
have done, and they have enhanced this writer's understanding of
products liability to no small degree. And yet, I believe that the
authors' condensation of their position in this latest Article successfully and accurately reflects the essence of their proposed solutions
[I]n this litigation defendants steadfastly maintained that there was no feasible way
for them to put the [wastes] on land. They claimed that the costs of such 'a system
would be prohibitive and that furthermore such a system was technologically infeasible. It is the Court's conclusion that this position was taken by defendants in bad faith,
that it was contrary to the facts as they knew them, and was pursued for the sole
purpose of delaying the final resolution of the controversy.
380 F. Supp. at 64. In effect, what the court expected from the defendant was greater
cooperation in the interests of the public good. The plaintiffs claimed that feasible alternatives
were available, but apparently had difficulties in proving their claims. Given the potential
threat to public health, the court felt that the defendant should have helped the plaintiffs
prove-their case. The court explains:
It is interesting to note that although the defendants claimed that the calcium
situation was a problem that precluded them from developing an on land system of
disposal and although they had at their disposal over 400 chemists, they had conducted no engineering studies in an effort to solve the problem.
380 F. Supp. at 68. And finally, referring to the defendant's refusal to develop and share with
the court an adequate alternative disposal plan, the court concludes: "Such action in the
defense of any lawsuit is a serious matter. In light of the issues in the instant case dealing with
health and safety of thousands such action is intolerable." Id.
Understandable though the court's reactions in that case might be from a psychological
perspective, I submit that in substance the court was admonishing the defendants for having
insisted upon turning the case into an "old-fashioned Model T lawsuit." Of course, I am
relying upon the opinion as my source of information as to what actually happened in this
case. As I read the opinion, the "bad faith" to which the court refers was not a misrepresentation of existing fact, but rather a failure to cooperate in the court's efforts to explore the
possibilities in an open-ended fashion. For the reasons I have already advanced, adjudication
cannot rationally solve this kind of environmental design problem without more guidance by
way of applicable legal standards. Given the impossibility of the task it was asked to perform,
the court was reduced under the circumstances to chastising the defendant's lawyers for
having behaved too much like advocates representing their clients interests, and not enough
like ombudsmen representing the public welfare. Although such a reaction may be understandable, I find it exceedingly unfortunate. Not surprisingly, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit finally removed the district judge from the case for having
abandoned his impartiality. Reserve Mining Co. v. Lord, 44 U.S.L.W. 2306 (8th Cir., Jan. 6,
1976).
54 See, e.g., Articles cited note 1 supra.
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to the difficulties-in the final analysis, they are calling for a combination of "lawyer's restraint" and 'judicial activism" to overcome
difficulties that, at least as I view them, are inherent in the nature of
the design defect issue itself. Some of their suggestions might be
quite useful in combination with approaches that recognize the
element of polycentricity in these cases and attempt to cope with that
element; but on their own, without such recognition, the authors'
suggestions must be (and I am quite sure will be) rejected by both
bench and bar.
Rejecting the suggestion that we ought to reduce or eliminate
the adversariness of the adversary process, or the litigiousness of
litigation, what should we adopt as the basis for a rational solution to
the recognized difficulties presented in these design defect cases?
Essentially, we should concern ourselves with methods of recasting
the issues presented in design defect cases so as to make them more
adjudicable. By one means or another the rules governing liability
must be rendered more specific so that they afford lawyers the
opportunity to behave like advocates, and at the same time avoid
presenting all the potential issues in these cases "in one neat
polycentric mass. 5 5 In effect, the authors call for a combination of
greater self-restraint on the part of lawyers and more active involvement on the part of judges to separate out issues procedurally
and to narrow the range of disagreement between the parties. I am
firmly convinced that this needed separation and narrowing is
primarily the responsibility of the substantive law itself.5 6 There
must be sufficient formality in the rules governing liability to permit
adjudication to work. To some extent, of course, the rule formality
of which I speak will serve to reduce the central role of the courts in
attaining the social objective of adequate product design safety. So
be it. Adjudication has limits which we will continue to exceed only
at our peril.
But mine is not the counsel of despair. In the conclusion of my
earlier Article, I outlined two basic ways in which design defect cases
can be made adjudicable while at the same time allowing courts to
play an active role in design defect cases. First, courts can continue
to develop and implement the failure-to-warn theory about which
much has been said in the foregoing remarks. Second, courts can
begin to apply the specific product design standards established
administratively by governmental agencies more suited to perform
the standard-setting function.

'5 See Twerski

535.
" See Henderson 1535-36.
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To these, I can now add a third possibility, based in part on the
advantage of almost three years of hindsight since the publication of
my original Article. It is becoming increasingly obvious to me that it
may be possible for courts, over time, to develop categories and rules
of liability by which the scope of judicial inquiry in design defect
cases could be narrowed and focused sufficiently to make them
amenable to adjudication. In those product design areas in which
the pressures upon courts to intervene are greatest, 57 courts are to a
limited extent intervening. 5 8 The early cases have been, and are,
unmanageable, for the reasons I have advanced. However, gradually it may be expected that middle ground generalizations and
categorizations5 9 will emerge by means of which at least a portion of
the ad hoc, open-ended quality of these cases may be eliminated.
Such a development would be no more nor less than the sort of
gradual, incremental development of doctrine that we have come to
associate with the process of common-law decision. It may already be
possible to discern the beginnings of such a process of rule development in the relatively active area of judicial review of automo60
bile design.
Even if such a development should be possible, however, we
ought not to assume that it will occur, or that it will come at insubstantial cost. Time will be required to develop such a body of workable doctrine. The strain upon the judicial system will be great,
possibly too great to be borne without serious loss of morale and
eventual breakdown. Perhaps the most important point is that the
development will almost certainly not occur, nor will it occur in time,
without the help of legal scholars. Ironically, scholarship in the
products liability field has been, from the standpoint of rendering
design defect cases manageable, almost entirely counterproductive.
Most of the articles in the last ten or fifteen years have never even
questioned whether design cases pose litigational difficulties, and
have instead urged courts to address the most open-ended types of
issues in the name of helping to make our society a safer place in
57 Id. at 1565-66 nn. 145-47 and accompanying text.
58 Id. at 1566-69, 1571-73.
59 Even the proponents of the broadest, most open-ended analyses of the substantive
objectives of tort law appear to recognize the necessity for developing categories with which to
implement their ideas. See, e.g., Calabresi & Hirschoff, Toward a Testfor Strict Liability in Torts,
81 YALE L.J. 1055, 1070 (1972).
60 1 have in mind decisions such as Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 489 F.2d 1066
(4th Cir. 1974), and Mieher v. Brown, 54 Ill. 2d 539, 301 N.E.2d 307 (1973), in which the
courts recognized the existence of a common-law duty to adhere to a general standard of
reasonableness in auto design, and yet denied liability as a matter of law. See J. HENDERSON &
R. PEARSON, THE TORTS PRocEss 648-49 (1975).
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which to live. 61 Doctrinal formalities that might have helped to
render the issues more manageable have been almost universally
scorned as arbitrary impediments to allowing the jury in every case
to render justice in light of all the circumstances. 62 These tendencies
on the part of legal scholars will have to be reversed if the necessary
rules governing liability are to be developed.
CONCLUSION

As the foregoing remarks make clear, I disagree with the authors' analysis of a number of basic questions. They maintain that
failure to warn is inadequate to ensure product safety; I insist that its
inadequacy in this regard begs the very question I meant to raisei.e., whether, on their own, courts can do ihore. They assert that
failure to warn is complex and polycentric; I argue that the former
adjective may sometimes apply, but not the latter. They insist that
the design defect issue is not polycentric; I rely upon both my
analysis and their own prior work to demonstrate that the design
defect issue is highly polycentric. And finally, they advance as a
solution the reworking of the adversary process of adjudication to
make it less adversary and less adjudicative; I urge as a necessary
first step the recognition that the legal rules governing liability must
be sufficiently specific and formal to narrow the focus of the inquiry
in these cases.
My hope is that I have not been unnecessarily critical of the
authors' work. After all, we agree on what I assume to be the most
important point-that the litigation of design defect cases reveals
serious signs of strain and impending breakdown.: As I indicated,
there is much in what they have said, including their earlier work,
which I find useful. But their analysis will help most in what I hope
will be the second phase of recovery from the present difficulties.
First, and most basically, we must face the reality that courts--even
courts with "1976-type" procedures-cannot solve every type of
problem brought to them. More than anything else, we require rules
of liability that operate to reduce the open-endedness of these cases
to more manageable proportions. I have in these remarks advanced
61 See Henderson 1531-32 nn.2-3. I hope to demonstrate this same tendency and develop
its implications in the broader field of torts in an upcoming article in the Indiana LawJournal
this spring.
62 Id. Ironically, this is the attitude reflected in the authors' Article to which my remarks
are primarily directed. Although the authors recognize that the "justice under all the circumstances" approach is presently creating difficulties in design defect cases, they attribute these
difficulties to shortcomings in procedure rather than in substantive law.
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three possibilities which, in combination, would accomplish this institutional imperative.
Reading through their Article again, I am left with an abiding
sense that the authors never did really understand the point I was
trying to make. Very likely they will feel the same way upon reading
these remarks. Perhaps that is why law reviews occasionally indulge
in this type of publishing enterprise-to allow their readers to make
sense out of what appears to the writers on both sides of an issue to
be an intractable impasse.

